summary of Ihc main political Lrcnds and cvcnts of 1983-90 which had an important bcaring on thc evolulion of civil-miliiary rclations. Thc follovving thrcc scctions take up four crucial aspccls of thc story -that is, thc scparation of thc military and civilian functions of govcrnmcnt, thc subordination of thc military lo thc civil powcr, thc role of thc Prcsidcnt bctween 1983 and 1989 , and thc cvolution of military attitudcs tovvards sccularism and islam which, it appcars, was thc most important point of idcological conflict bctwccn the military and thc govcrnmcnt during thc 1980s. The final section tries to offcr some assessmcnt of thc proccss of military disengagcmcnt from politics during thcse ycars, and somc explanations of it.
Political Trends, 1983-1990:
Sincc this papcr aims to conccntratc on thc role of the armcd l'orccs in politics since 1983, it is inappropriate to rctcll the wholc of thc story of Turkcy's political evolulion over thcse ycars. Nevcrthcless, ccrtain points need to bc highlightcd. Thcy can be summarised as follows.
Firstly, although Turgut Ö/.al's Mothcrland Party was a somevvhat eclcctic formation, in which liberal, Islamic conscrvative and ultra nationalist factions werc wcldcd together in an uncasy alliancc, it providcd Turkcy with an intcrval of stable civilian govcrnmcnt which she had not knovvn sincc Süleyman Dcmircl's first adminislration of 1965-69. Political violcnce was not cxtinguishcd, especially in thc Kurdish inhabited provinccs of southcastcrn Anatolia, but thc phase of rampant icrrorism which had almost brought thc country to its knees in 1980 sccmcd lo be over. This was combined wiıh a high level of cconomic grovvih, and a gencrally succcssful transilion towards a more liberal and cxtcrnally oricntcd cconomy. To put thc casc crudcly, thc civilian regimc could be said to have done a rcasonably good job, and thc conditions of aetual or allcgcd crisis which had lcd to the prcvious military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980 did not recur. Concurrcncc bctvveen the military and the Ö/.al adminislration was cnhanccd by thc fact Ihat, sincc thc fail of thc first Nihat Erim govcrnmcnt in Dcccmber 1971, the military had progressively abandoncd its former attachıncnt to an etatist or interventionist cconomic policy. By 1980, it was acceptcd by both thc military and thc ccntrc-right of Turkish politics that there was no practical altcrnative lo ıhc shift towards a liberal market economy, wiıh a greate degree of integration inlo intcrnational markets. Hcnce, cconomic policy ccascd to bc a potential sourcc of conflict betvveen thc military and the governmcnt.
At thc outset of Özal's premiership, a serious problem affccıcd the political system as a wholc, in that the exclusion of thc Social Dcmocracy Party (SDP) and ıhc True Palh Party (TPP) from ıhc 1983 eleetions raiscd serious doubts about ıhc democratic lcgilimacy of thc parliament. It look four years to rcsolve this problem. Ncvcrlhclcss, thc task was achicved withoul 3 any of thc violent shocks to thc systcm which mighı have becn cxpcctcd. The Nationalist Dcmocracy Party, ihc lcast wcll supporled of thc thrcc pariics in parliamcnt, rapidly dissolvcd, and failcd to survivc to fight thc 1987 general clcctions. Thc Popülist Party, which was thc sccond of thc two parties set up with the cncouragemcnt of thc military regimc in 1983, mcrgcd with the SDP in 1985 as the Social Dcmocrat Popülist Party (SDPP) Ihus bccoming the main and lcgitimatc party of thc centre lcft. Finally, in 1987, ali the pre-1980 political lcadcrs rcgaincd thc political rights vvhich had becn denied them by thc original text of the 1982 constitution. Wiıh thc exccptions of communism and Kurdish nationalism, virtually ali slrands of opinion were now allowed to compcte frecly in the political market placc. By the time of thc 1987 clcctions, it secmcd hard to sustain the eharge, often madc in 1983, that Turkey wou!d hcnccforth be a 'guidcd dcmocracy', rcstrictcd by rigid limitations laid down by the military.
Thc most serious test of thc military withdrawal from Turkislı politics occurred in Novcmbcr 1989, whcn Kenan Evrcn's term as Prcsidcnt of thc Rcpublic cxpired. Sincc 1961, ali Turkcy's Prcsidcnts had been retired senior commandcrs. Thc Presidcncy, along with thc National Sccurity Coııncil, vvas unofficially regarded as thc military's foothold in thc civilian political systcm. The succcssion of a civilian candidate could ıhus bc sccn as thc breaking of a powcrful tradition. In thc event, Turgut Özal's clcction was not achicved without considcrable controvcrsy, mainly bccause il vvas clcar that, as thc founder and mainstay of thc ruling party, it would bc impossible for him to excrcisc his povvcrs with thc degree of ncutrality which thc constitution assumes. The shift Lowards a morc aetive and cxccutivc Presidcncy vvas also felt to bc contrary to thc spiril of bolh thc 1961 and 1982 conslitulions. What vvas remarkable about Özal's clcction, hovvcvcr, vvas thc fact thal the succession of a civilian politician did nol producc thc crisis in civil-miliıary relations vvhich could have becn expecicd. In Fcbruary 1988, Kenan Evren had announccd that hc vvould not seck a sccond term (vvhich vvould in any casc have rcquircd a constitulional amendment). Aflcr this, the issuc vvas effcctivcly laid to rest: thc idca that hc could only bc succccdcd by a retired military commander vvas occasionally hinted al, but not scriously advanccd.
In parallcl vvith these changcs, thc ycars after 1983 also savv thc gradual vvilhdravval of other political rcstrictions. In 1990, Turks vvere stili bcing proscculcd for no more ıhan exprcssing radical political vievvs, and some controls on ıhc press remained in placc -particularly affccling reporting on thc Kurdish problem. Ncverthelcss, there had becn an important degree of rclaxation in the application of lcgislation vvhich vvas arguably quite contrary to intcrnationally acccpted principles of human rights (in parıicular, the notorious Articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Pcnal Code). Political ırials, such as those of thc Turkish Peace Association and of DİSK, the radical lcfl-vving labour confedcration, dragged on for years after 1983, but the accuscd wcrc ali evcntually released, and it seemed unlikcly that similar large scalc witchhunts would bc rcpcatcd. DİSK unlikcly that similar large scalc witch-hunts would be rcpcatcd. DİSK rcmained banncd as an organisation, but thc middle of the road Türk-İş, Turkey's biggest tradcs union confedcration, gradually began to exercise its industrial muscle by calling strikes in a numbcr of industries. By 1990, it even appearcd possible that thc official ban on the formation of a communist party might be liftcd, although thc legal slalus of the 'United Communist Party of Turkey' -the first overground communist party since thc 1920s -was stili in doubt. Under the constitution, any sort of Kurdish separalist activity, and cvcn thc use of thc Kurdish language, rcmained forbiddcn, but here loo there wcre some signs of a rclaxation of official attitudes. In July 1990 thc SDPP issued a report on thc 'Eastcrn and South Eastcrn Region', which drew attention to its cconomic negleet, and called for the lifling of thc blankct ban on thc usc of Kurdish. Thc report was given a frosty reccption by Özal but, granted the sensitivity of Europcan opinion on this score, it did sccm possible that somc concessions might cvcntually bc allowcd.
Military and Civilian Po\vers:
Distinguishing bctvveen military and civilian regimes is not alvvays as casy as it may sccm at first glancc, sincc there arc many regime typcs vvhich can bc deseribed as only partly civilianiscd. In the case of Grcccc, for instance, onc can say with somc degree of confidcncc that thc regime bciwccn This leaves one with ıhc Uisk of producing an acccptablc dcfinition of thc civilian rcgimc. To summarisc a polcnlially long and complcx argumcnt, it can bricfiy bc said that a plausiblc model of liberal civilian govcrnmcnt assumes thc existcncc of three main conditions. Thc first is that thc military should not cxcrcisc thc powcrs of govcrnmcnt, cilhcr dircclly and formally (as had occurrcd in Turkey during 1960-61 and 1980-83) or indircctly (as in 1971-73) . In short, there should be an clcctcd and autonomous civilian govcrnmcnt, with real powcrs. Thc sccond is that, within a civilian rcgimc, thc role of the military should bc restrieled to its professional funetions -in other words that thc armcd forccs should not bc allovvcd to dccidc (as distinet from executc) policy on thcir own, allhough they may have a role in policy making, cspccially in thc dcfcncc field. Thc tlıird, and related condition, is that thc armcd forccs should bc fully subjcctcd to thc control of thc civilian govcrnmcnt, although thc latter should givc duc regard to thcir professional interests and policy proposals. To relurn to thc Turkish casc, it can bc argucd that the first condition had largely been met in Novcmbcr-Dcccmbcr 1983, whcn thc military rcgimc which had rulcd Turkey since 12 Scptcmbcr 1980 was formally dissolved, and powcr was handcd over to an clcctcd civilian govcrnmcnt. Thc sccond and third conditions, howcvcr, have been far morc difficult to achicvc. It is argucd, in fact, that even at times whcn Turkey has officially been rulcd by an clcctcd civilian govcrnmcnt, thc political system has never been fully civilianiscd. Thc rcasons advanccd arc that thc military has been responsible for large arcas of dccision-making which should propcrly be allottcd to the civil powcr, and that thc govcrnmcnt has been lcft virtually powcrlcss over, for instancc, thc allocation of thc military budgct or thc detcrminalion of national dcfcncc policy. 4 On thc first scorc, it sccms hard to deny that there was a steady withdrawal of the military from thc work of govcrnmcnt after 1983. Howcvcr, this proccss was only a gradual onc, sincc at the outset Ö/.al's govcrnmcnt inherited a situation in vvhich, onc year after the official relurn to a civilian regimc, martial law was stili in l'orcc in 47 of thc country's 67 provinccs. Thcsc ineluded virlually ali of thc Kurdish-inhabitcd /.onc of soulh-eastern Anatolia, plus most of thc industrialiscd regions of wcstcrn and southcrn Turkcy. VVilhin thcsc provinccs, martial law couris wcrc stili in opcration, and ıhc military authoriıics had thc right (which thcy somclimcs uscd) to ban strikcs and control publications. At this stagc, it was suggcslcd that thcrc was somcthing of a division of labour at thc top of Turkish govcrnmcnt in which thc military, through Prcsidcnt Evren, was responsible for dcciding policy in the fields of domcstic and cxtcrnal sccurily, with Özal and his cabinct controlling cconomic and social policy. 5 Howcvcr, over thc following four ycars, thc army's role was subjcctcd to steady erosion, as martial law was stcadily withdrawn. By Novcmbcr 1986 thc number of provinccs affcctcd had been rcduccd to fivc -ali of them in thc soulh castfalling to l'ourby July 1987.
At this point, thc govcrnmcnt dccidcd to usc thc powcrs vested in it by a spccial State of Emcrgcncy Law to dcclarc thc four provinccs remaining under martial law, together wilh four ncighbouring provinccs, a 'Rcgional State of Emcrgcncy Govcrnoratc', hcadcd by a civilian 'Coordinator Govcrnor' (known informally in thc press as a 'supcr-Govcrnor') Hayri Ko/.akçıoğlu. Thc 'State of Emcrgcncy' allowcd thc authoritics to implcmcnt somcthing of a half way house bctwccn l'ull martial law and a normal civilian regime, in which thc civilian authoritics wcrc given spccial powcrs to maintain order and control political activitics. Undcr thc 'supcr-Governor', thc army and gendarmcric continucd lo carry out seareh and dcsiroy operations against thc PKK. To this cxtent, Turkcy could stili bc said to fail short of thc fully civilian model of dcmocralic governmcnt.
On thcsc grounds, thc SDPP's 'caslcrn Rcport' urged that thc spccial Govcrnoratc shoukl bc withdrawn, and thc normal system of local administration applicd instead. Howcvcr, thcrc wcrc prcccdcnts for this typc of situation in other dcmocracics (for instancc, in Northern Ircland) and it only affcctcd a rcmotc and thinly populatcd part of thc country. By 1990, for thc vast majority of Turks, thc soldiers had long sincc disappearcd from the streets, exccpt whcn off duty, and dircct rulc by thc military was a fading memory.
Thc initial application of martial law was not thc only inslilulional element inheriled by thc civilian govcrnmcnt which gavc thc military thc opportunity for a dccision-making role in thc post-1983 regime. Of thcse, thc most notable wcrc thc Prcsidcntial Council, thc National Sccurity Council, which was given cııhanccd powcrs undcr thc 1982 constitution, and thc extcnsion of the aulhority of thc Presidenl. So long as Kenan Evren, or some other retired general, occupicd thc prcsidcncy, thcn most Turks wcrc likcly to see this as an important part of thc military voicc in thc political systcm.
In practicc, thc Prcsidcntial Council turncd out to bc casily thc lcast effcctivc of thcsc inslilutions. Under Provisional Articlc 2 of the constitution, it was composcd of thc Chicf of thc General Staff and thc four forcc commanders who had madc up thc National Sccurity Council at thc time of thc transfer of powcr in Novcmbcr 1983. its funetions were to cxaminc laws adoptcd by parliament conccrning fundamental rights and freedoms, thc principlcs of sccularism and thc reforms of Atatürk, nalional sccurity, public order and other matters. On thc rcqucst of thc Presidenl, it was to considcr and givc an opinion "on matters relating to thc holding of new general clcctions, thc cxcrcisc of cmcrgcncy povvcrs and thc measures to bc laken during a siatc of cmcrgcncy...and thc conduct of rcligious affairs." Thc Prcsidcntial Council was to bc vvound up six years after ıhc rcconvcning of parliament.
7 As it was, ils aciiviıics wcrc very litllc reporled: if il did play any important role in influcncing dccisions from behind thc sccncs, thcn ıhis was very vvcll hidden. Whcn thc Council was cvcntually dissolved in Novembcr 1989, ils passing attractcd virlually no public attention, and sccırıs to have madc no diflcrencc to thc balancc of powcr bctvvccn ıhc military and civilian politicians.
A sccond, and morc imporlanl l'ocus of conccrn was thc political role of thc National Sccurity Council (NSC). This had originally been established under thc 1961 constitution, and was composcd of the Prcsidcnt, the Prime Ministcr, Ministcrs of State and Dcputy Prime Ministcrs of Dcfcncc, Intcrior, Forcign Affairs, Financc, Transport and Labour, and, on thc armed scrviccs side, thc Chicf of thc General Slaff, and thc Commanders of thc Land Forces, Navy and Air Forcc. In this way, thc civilian members of thc Council wcrc in a clcar majority. Thc NSC's powcrs wcrc incrcascd by thc 1982 constitution, which rcquircd thc govcrnmcnt "to givc priority considcration" to tlıc dccisions of thc NSC in matters which il "dccms neccssary for thc preservation of thc cxislcncc and indcpcndcncc of the staic". This cnhanccd its former powcrs under ıhc prcvious conslitulion, under which thc NSC was to "rccommcnd" to ıhc govcrnmcnl "thc ncccssary basic vicws for dccisions to bc taken in conncclion with nalional sccurity and coordination". At ıhc samc time, ils membership was rcduccd to l'our cabincl members (thc Prime Ministcr and thc Ministcrs of Dcfcncc, Forcign Affairs and Ihc Intcrior) plus thc four forcc commandcrs (that is, adding thc Commandcr of Gcndarmcric to llıc ihree prcvious members). Hcncc, thc civilian members of thc Council would only bc in a majority if thc Prcsidcnt THE TURKİSH YEARBX)K [OL. XXV volcd wilh thcm. 8 As had bccn the case bcforc 1980, the NSC was thc most important regular and formal point of contact between the armcd forccs commandcrs, thc Prcsidcnt and thc govcrnmcnt. Thc dcgrcc to which it actually madc policy, rathcr than mcrcly advising thc govcrnment on security and dcfcncc qucstions, and thc cxtcnt to which it discusscd and cxpresscd vicws on qucstions not dircctly to thcsc topics, vvcrc a crucial test of how far Turkey had advanccd towards a fully civilian rcgimc.
On occasions, the NSC cxpresscd vicws on what could not strictly bc considcrcd military matters: for cxamplc in July 1986, it complaincd of thc "undesirable bclicfs" which wcrc allcgcdly imparted by rcligious programmes on state radio and television, and in January 1987 it drcw thc governmcnt's attention tovvards thc signs of a religious rcvival in Turkey.
9 Howevcr, as time passed it appcars to have rctrcatcd into a morc strictly military and advisory role. It gcncrally ccascd to issuc pronounccmcnts on political matters vvlıich could not bc elaimed as having a dircct rcfcrcncc to national dcfcncc and sccurity (though thc latter naturally ineluded thc sensitive qucstion of thc Kurds). Hcncc, by thc end of thc 1980s, thc idca that thc NSC constitutcd somc şort of sccrct military govcrnmcnt of Turkey sccms to have bccn a scrious cxaggcralion.
Thc ineremental withdrawal of martial law, thc demişe of thc Presidcntial Council, and thc limitalion of thc role of thc NSC to strictly military funetions, ali suggcst that the independent dccision-making powcr of thc armcd forccs noticcably dcclincd after 1983. Thcsc left open thc qucstion of the dcgrcc to vvhich thc clcctcd govcrnmcnt had started to invadc thc military's prcvious autonomy in running its own affairs. Here again, the evidcnce suggests that by thc end of thc 1980s thc govcrnmcnt had begun to advancc towards thc position of thc wcstcm dcmocracics in vvhich the civil powcr fully controls thc military, alıhough thc proccss was very far from complcte. An important sign of the changing timcs occurrcd in Junc 1987 whcn General Necdet Uruğ, who had succccdcd Nurettin Ersin as Chicf of the General Staff in 1985, bccamc duc for retirement. His cxpcctcd succcssor was General Nccdct Öztorun, thc Commandcr of Land Forccs. Had it happened, the appointmcnt of Öztorun would havc corrcspondcd to thc normal rank hierarchy at thc top of thc armcd forccs, in which commandcrs usually movcd one rung up the laddcr following a retirement. His promotion was also said to bc supporled by the other top commandcrs. Howcvcr, Öztorun was reported to havc annoyed Özal by his allcgedly faulty handling of thc sccurity problem in south-castcrn Anatolia and, in particular, by his failurc to inforııı thc prime minister of a particularly vicious atlack by thc PKK on Pınarcık villagc, in Mardin provincc, on 21 Junc. It was also reported that there was tension bctvvccn Özal and somc of his generals, who complaincd that the Islamic fundamentalist faction was wiclding too much influcnce in thc Mothcrland Party.
Undcr thc constitulion, thc Chicf of thc General Staff is appointcd by the Presidcnt on thc proposal of thc cabinct and is responsible to thc prcmicr in thc excrcisc of his dutics. On 29 Junc Özel caused somcthing of a slock by announcing that General Necip Torumtay, thc dcputy Chicf of thc General Staff, would succccd Uruğ, forcing Öztorun to resign thc fo!lowing day. Torumtay took over tcmporarily as Commandcr of Land Forccs on 1 July, before duly succccding as Chicf of thc General Staff in August.
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In most countrics, thc fact that thc prime minister had cxcrciscd his constitutional right to nominate thc top commandcr of thc armcd forccs, cven if against thc wishcs of senior generals, would hardly havc causcd anylhing of a stir. In Turkcy, howcvcr, it scvcrcly challcngcd the tradilion of military autonomy, cxcmplificd by thc idca that thc intcrnal organisation of thc armcd forccs was a matter only for thc generals, over which civilian politicians should not havc cffcctivc control. In this casc, the contcst was complicatcd by rumours that Prcsidcnt Evren, who was responsible for appointing thc cabinct's nomincc and was treated by most pcopİe as thc armcd forccs, main rcprcscntativc in thc political strueture, was not a wholchcartcd supporter of Öztorun. Ccrtainly, hc docs not scem to havc madc any objcction to Torumtay's appointmcnt. Bc that as it may, thc outeome was sccn at thc time as an important victory by thc govcrnmcnt over the corporatc interests of thc military.
Furthcr signs of this trend vvere apparent during thc Gulf crisis of 1990. For thc first time sincc thc lale 1940s, thcrc was a distinet risk (even if a fairly remote one) that Turkcy's national sccurity might bc in jeopardy, or ıhat Turkey might bccomc involvcd in majör mililary operations. As in thc Birand deseribed this as an "cxtrcmcly hcalthy situation from the vicvvpoint of thc management of thc counlry" 13 since it kept thc army out of political polcmics and argument. It also signalised Turkcy's transilion tovvards thc liberal dcmocratic model of military-civilian relations, in vvhich thc civilian political lcadcrship is rcady to pay due regard to thc opinions of thc commandcrs on strictly military qucstions, but vvhere thc military is effcctivcly depoliücised, and ullimatc authority rests firmly with thc civilians. This is not to suggcst that thc proccss has reachcd the stagc of full civilian control ovcr the military. Under thc Constitution, thc Chicf of the General Staff remains ansvvcrablc to thc President, not the Ministcr of Dcfcncc. As Mehmet Ali Birand remarks in another contcxt, "fcars that the army might bccome an instrument of politics have, in the words of a former Ministcr, rcduced the Ministry of Dcfcncc to thc status of an 'cquipmcnt office'".
14 A further sign of thc continuing tendeney to regard the military as an independent world apart is thc fact that, allhough Turkcy's cxternal sccurity environment has been transformcd ovcr thc past ycar by thc collapsc of the Warsaw Pact, there has been very littlc public debate as to how her defence posturc should be altercd in response. As in the military, in which thc eleeted govcrnmcnt docs not have thc righı to determine long run policy. 15 On thc other hand, the conduct of policy in thc Gulf crisis appears to indicatc that a gradual transition towards thc model of civilian control may be cmerging.
The Role of the President, 1983-1989:
A crucial part of thc proccss of military disengagement from politics during the 1980s was thc political role of President Evren. Although the Prcsidcnt had officially resigncd from thc army on taking officc in Novcmbcr 1982, he almost certainly maintaincd elose links with thc serving commanders thercaftcr: (in fact, thc formal position of thc Prcsidcnt as Commandcr-in-Chicf mcant that hc was constitutionally entitled to do this). Above ali, Prcsidcnt Evren was popularly, and probably correctly, regarded as the chief representalive of thc military in thc civilian political strueture. In thc proccss of military disengagement from politics, Evren's retirement from thc Prcsidcncy in Novcmber 1989 endcd this aspcct of thc army's political 14 Birand, Emret Komutanım!, p. 415. Scc also Özdcmir, Rejim ve Asker, pp. 252-54, 256-63. 15 Two exceptions to this may bc noted. IN 1987 a pionccring study in Turkish of nalional dcfence stralegy vvas publishcd by the Foreign Policy Institutc in Ankara, which recogniscd thc nccd for wider discussion of dcfcncc questions, and set out to meet it: Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu ct. al., Türkiye'nin Savunması, Ankara, Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1987. Unfortunatcly, a good deal of the material containcd in this study has now been rendercd rather obsolete by the dramatic changcs in eastcrn Europe, and the new framework of East-West relations. Thc other is thc fact that a public debate has fitfully started about thc desirability of continuing universal military servicc: (see, e.g., Milliyet, 16 June 1990). However, this debate would probably have arisen anyway, without thc rcccnt changcs in the international environment, since it arises partly from demographic factors, and not just questions of defence strategy.
role, and appcarcd to elose a ehapter in civil-military relations which had begun in 1961. What is important, howcvcr, is that Evrcn's cxcrcisc of his presidential powcrs appears to have altcred substantially during his term as President, and that his succession by Özal seems to have marked a far less abrupt turning point than might at first appcar.
At thc outset, President Evren seems to have adoptcd a distinctly cautious attitude tovvards the proccss of dcmocralisation: (this caution, it can be argued, vvas morc than justificd by Turkey's political expcricnccs during the late 1970s). Howcvcr, as time wcnt on, and political stability appcarcd to be relalively wcll assurcd, hc seems to have acceptcd that thc civilian political lcaders vvould assumc fuller authority, and that his own role as President vvould dcclinc corrcspondingly. 16 An carly and important example of this occurrcd in January 1984 whcn parliamcnt passed thc bili providing for local elcctions on 25 March, and allowing ıhc participation of those parties who had been excludcd from thc 1983 general elcctions. On 12 January, thc President vetoed thc bili, returning it to thc Asscmbly according to the constitutional proccdure. The original bili vvas tcchnically at fault, in that it arbitrarily callcd for thc reduetion in thc size of somc local councils vvhich had bccn cstablishcd by anothcr lavv. Hovvcver, il is likely that Evren's real objection to thc bili vvas ihat il allovvcd thc Social Dcmocrats and Demircl's Truc Palh Party back onto thc clccloral stage only a l' cvv monlhs after ıhey had spccifically bccn cxcludcd by ıhc military. On 15 January ıhc Assembly rcconsidcrcd the bili, and repassed it vvith only minör amcndmcnts, lcaving Evren vvilh no altcrnative bul to approvc it on ıhc follovving day, vvhatever his private reservalions. In this carly test, as on subscqucnt occasions, ıhc constitutional machincry vvas adhcrcd to vvilh impressive smoothncss.
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In general, President Evren camc aeross to thc Turkish public as a fatherly figüre vvho could occasionally issuc bluff vvarnings, but usually pulled in his horns ralher than crcatc a political crisis. A crucial casc vvas his attitude tovvards ıhc return of political rights to ıhc prc-1980 party lcadcrs. Until 1986 hc stuck strictly to thc vicvv that Provisional Articlc 4 of the constitution, vvhich forbad thc former party lcadcrs to engage in any kind of political activity until 1992 should bc kept in placc: at thc opening of parliamcnt in Septcmbcr 1985 hc stressed ihat thc bans forbad them lo makc any kind of political stalcmcnis, provoking protests from Demirci. By the follovving year, hovvcver, it vvas bccoming incrcasingly clear that upholding the bans vvas bccoming less and less praclicablc. Accordingly, on 5 ' ^This suggcstion is madc by Dodd, Turkish Democracy, 1990 cdn, p.
106. John H. McFadden, "Civil-Military Relations in the Third Turkish Republic", Middle Iîast Journal, Vol. 39 (1985) , p. 84.
Novcmbcr 1986, he hcld a mecting vvith opposition İcadcrs, aftcr which he announccd that hc was in favour of lifting thc bans, although hc admitted that this would bc a mattcr for parliament to dccidc. This clcarcd thc way for thc proccss of vviıhdravving Provisional Anide 4 during 1987.
Anothcr less critical but nonelheless illustrativc incidcnt occurrcd at thc end of April 1988. On 28-29 April scrious disturbanccs broke out in İstanbul and other univcrsitics, as studcnts protested against the tight govcrnmcnt controls ovcr highcr cducation. Thcsc wcrc accompanicd by a rencwcd upsurgc of violcncc by thc PKK in thc soulh-castcrn provinccs, provoking fcars that Turkey might bc reverting to thc anarehy of thc 1970s. Evren gavc voicc to thcsc conccrns on 30 April whcn hc told an audicncc in Trabzon that "there are pcople who want to push our country into anarehy...Turkey will not scc such days again. If Turkey is in a similar situation, thc forcc to resist this is the armcd forccs". Thc implicd threat that thc army might launch anothcr coup triggcrcd off predietable criticism from thc politicians, cspecially Dcmircl. Evren thcn appcarcd anxious to corrcct his mistakc: on 2 May hc assurcd thc public that "thc period of fights and disputes is ovcr. As long as unity exists, dcmocracy will progress step by step". Özal backcd thc Prcsidcnt up by stating that he "scriously and sinccrcly supports dcmocracy". 18 As on prcvious occasions, Evren had shown a worrying tendeney to makc unguardcd commcnts in public but was flcxiblc cnough to defuse thc situation before any scrious damagc had been done.
In excrcising aulhority ovcr govcrnmcnt appointmcnts, it is suggcstcd that Prcsidcnt Evren was opposcd to thc appointmcnt of sympathiscrs of thc former National Salvation and National ist Action Partics to top civil scrvicc posts. On thc other hand, hc docs not sccm to have prevented Ö/.al from bringing in his own team to key posts in the burcaucracy. In his pronouncemcnts on general political qucstions, hc stressed the valuc of hard work and responsible bchaviour, but slccred clcar of delivering any hard work and sepnonsible bchaviour, but stccrcd clcar of delivering any verdiets on economic policy, on thc grounds that this was outsidc his arca of responsibility. On other issues, his most striking change of hcart conccrncd thc continuation of capital punishment and thc ban on a communist party, both of which hc originally supported. In thc coursc of a visit to Wcst Gcrmany in Octobcr 1988, hc uncxpectcdly told journalists that hc acccptcd that cvcntually thc Communist Party would have to bc legalised in Turkey, and thc dcath sentcncc abolished. His convcrsion appcars to have been part of a gradual shift towards greater liberalism, as thc lcgacy of thc military regime progressively wcakcncd. 
Poiitics and islam, the Main Point of Conflict:
Thc only rcally scrious point of conflict betwccn thc govcrnmcnt and President Evren appcarcd to bc thc Mothcrland Party's cultivation of clcmcnLs of fundamentalist Müslim support -an issuc on which Evren cvidcnıly had the support of thc military members of the National Security Council. In his public spccches, the President attacked Islamic fundamentalism, along with communism and fascism, as one of thc main thrcats to the state and to Ataliirk's lcgacy. In thc long running battlc over the wcaring of 'Müslim' headscarves by womcn studcnts, hc vctocd a bili passed by parliamcnt in Novcmber 1988 which allovvcd freedom of dress for ali studcnts and faculty members. It vvas also said, though unprovcn, that objeetions by the President had been thc main rcason for thc exclusion from the cabinct of Mehmet Keçcciler and Vehbi Dinçerlcr, two prominent members of thc Mothcrland Party who wcrc usually associatcd vvilh thc party's Müslim fundamcnlalisi faction. This supposilion vvas strcnglhcncd by thc fact that both Keçeciler and Dinçerlcr vverc given posls in the cabinet formed by Yıldırım Akbulut in November 1989, after Evren's retirement from ıhc Prcsidcncy.
It is difficult to be calegorical about thc position of President Evren on thc vexcd qucstion of rcligion and polilics, hovvcver, sincc il containcd elements of ambiguity, vvhich rcflcclcd important changcs in Ihe naturc of the debate in Turkey. Ccrtainly, thc contest vvas not novv a straightforvvard elash betvvccn strict sccularism (rcprcscntcd by thc army) on thc onc hand and radical Islamic fundamentalism (rcprcscntcd by civilian political groups) on thc other, since thc lines of distinetion vvere frcqucnlly blurred, and there vverc many intermediate positions. Onc causc of the ehange lay in the ficld of forcign policy, in vvhich Turkey vvas novv developing elose relations vvilh conservativc Müslim countrics like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf slates. This encouraged somc redefinition of thc official position. In 1982, for instancc, Evren told a mceting in İstanbul of thc Governors of the Islamic Devclopmcnt Bank that "Turkey is an incxlricablc part of thc Islamic Community". 20 It is hard to imaginc that any President of Turkey could have made such a pronounccmcnt in carlicr dccadcs, vvithout provoking a storm of protest.
Within the domcstic political contcxt, also, the military regime of 1980-83 had modified thc army's prcviously strict stand on sccularism, and this ehange carricd over into the post-1983 period. Thc perception vvas that if the state cffcctively told its citi/.cns that rcligion played no part in official idcology, and ncglcctcd rcligious cducation, this left a moral void in thc upbringing of thc young which had prcviously been fillcd by Marxism, fascism and othcr anti-systcmic doctrincs. During thc latc 1970s, an intcllectual group had ariscn which had tricd to ovcrcomc thc apparcnt dichotomy bctween the official commitmcnt to secular nationalism and oppositional proponcnts of an Islamic idcntity, by projccting thc idca of a 'Turkish Islamic Synthcsis'. This proposcd, in effcct, that islam was a part of Turkish national culturc, rathcr than in conflict wilh it, and should be promoted as such. Without abandoning thc official commitmcnt to secularism (for instancc, Turkcy was stili rcfcrred to as a 'sccular' statc in Articlc 2 of thc 1982 constitulion) thc military regime had adoptcd some of thc elements of the 'synthcsis' -in particular, by ineluding in thc constitulion thc provision that "cducation and inslruction in rcligion and cthics" should be madc a compulsory part of thc curricula of ali primary and secondary sehools. 21 During the 1980s, thcrc was also a massivc cxpansion in the provision of spccial high sehools for Müslim imams and prcachcrs so that, by thc middlc of thc dccadc, around 30 per ccnı of ali high school studcnts were attending thcsc institutions.
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Thcrc is somc debate as to whcthcr thcsc changes had amounted to an atlempted dcpoliticisation of islam, or whcthcr thc military regime and its succcssor had exploitcd a mild form of Islamic docırines vvhich, as Paul J. Magnarella concludcs, was "dcsigned to reinlorcc rathcr than contradict statc authority".
23 Polilically, also, this evolulion had be judgcd against a background in which thc army was gcncrally wiıhdrawing itself from involvement in tricky idcological arguments. It sccmcd probable that the debate about thc political role of rcligion vvould continuc in Turkcy, as in othcr Müslim countrics, but at lcast thcrc vvas hope that it would bc less likely to contributc towards confrontation bctwccn thc military and civilian political lcadcrs than it had in thc past.
Assessment and Explanations:
Allhough Turkcy sulTered from a number of serious political problems after 1983 it appcars that, for thc first time for many ycars, these did not inelude any serious or overt elashes bctvvccn thc civilian political establishmcnt and thc military. In fact, thc army's withdrawal from the political scenc turned out to bc far morc smooth than most observers had 21 probably expcctcd. By thc cnd of thc dccadc, ncarly ali thc mcchanisms by which the military rcgimc of 1980-83 had planncd to impose its own pattcm on subscquent civilian politics (such as thc rcstrictions on the party structurc, and the aUcmptcd cxclusion of thc pre-1980 party leaders) had fadcd away. Thc process took a furlhcr step forward with Turgut Özal's clcction to thc Presidcncy in 1989. Admittcdly, thc armcd forccs stili appcarcd to retain a degree of autonomy from the civil povver which would probably have been rejcctcd in thc wcstcrn democracics. Ncverlhclcss, an important degree of military disengagement from politics had been achicvcd, and with rcmarkably littlc overt objcction from thc military commandcrs.
This tentative conclusion prompts thc qucslion as to why and how this disengagement was possiblc. In general, thc literatüre on thc problems faccd by thc military and civilian political lcadcrship in cffccting this kind of transition, and thc conditions in vvhich it may occur, is far less extcnsive than that sccking to explain thc political activism of thc military or thc proccss of military takeover. Thc Turkish case must clcarly bc dil ferentiated from those of, say, Grcccc in 1974 or Argcnlina in 1983 vvhere thc military vvithdravval occurrcd involuntarily, as thc rcsult of a disastrous foreign adventurc by a military rcgimc. Somc suggcstions may be madc, hovvcvcr, as to hovv a voluntary disengagement of thc Turkish type may bc cffcctcd.
S. E. Finer, for instancc, posits three conditions for such a proccss. Firstly, thc military lcadcrship must positively vvant to disengage: sccondly, it must be able to cstablish a successor rcgimc vvhich is viable vvithout military support and, thirdly, thc lovvcr or middlc ranking officcrs must have sufficicnt confidcncc in thcir commandcrs to vvithdravv to thcir barracks. Analysing thc Turkish cxpcricncc of 1961, C.H. Dodd adds thc conditions that thc military lcadcrship must climinatc thc 'anti-dcmocratic element' (if any) vvithin thc prcviously ruling junta, must mainlain unity bctvvccn the junta and thc military command, that thc military must not bc dividcd on partisan lines, and that a party or combinalion of partics must bc available to takc ovcr vvhom the military can trust. Finally, Christophcr Clapham and Gcorgc Philip suggest that armics having a high degree of unity of command structurc and of differentiation of thc military from civil socicty vvill tend to assumc a 'moderator' role in politics, stepping in occasionally vvhen thc civilian political systcm brcaks dovvn, but vvithdravving oncc thc conditions for thc re-cstablishmcnt of rcasonably stable and acccptablc civilian governmcnt scem sufficicntly assured.
Thc cvcnts of 1983-90 in Turkey suggcst ihat Ihcse condilions wcrc wcll met. Unlikc its prcdcccssor of 1960-61, thc military regime of 1980-83 was not dividcd by inter-rank or corrcsponding idcological divergenees. General Evren and his four forcc commanders had maintaincd control ovcr thcir subordinates throughout, and there sccms to have been no scrious danger of a counter-coup, either during or after thc period of military governmcnt.
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With the inauguration of thc Constitucnt Asscmbly in Octobcr 1981, thc junta committcd itself to a return to clcctcd civilian govcrnmcnt, and never sccms to have seriously wavcrcd from that commitment. Nor wcrc there any elashes bctwccn thc junta and thc serving military commandcrs (as there had been in 1961) sincc General Evren and his elose collcagucs wcrc carcful to kccp both military and political command in thcir own hands.
26 Abovc ali, a notable featurc of thc Turkish army's corporatc culturc is its cxtrcme emphasis on mainlaining thc hicrarchical chain of command (a ncccssity frcqucntly referred to by General Evren at thc time) and its high degree of differenliation from civil society. Thc poinl has frcqucntly madc that Turkish army officcrs regard themselves as a world apart, and are cncouragcd to do so by their intcrnal cducational system. 27 They thus tend to act as a bloc, and to avoid 'contamination' from divisivc civilian political movements. This cohcsivcncss had not been achicvcd casily or automatically, since fundamcntal divisions, both within thc ruling junta and bctvvccn thc junta and the serving commandcrs had emerged during thc carlicr military regime of 1960-61. Hovvcvcr, the rapid collapsc of thc two attempted countcr-coups lcd by Coloncl Talât Aydemir in Fcbruary 1962 and May 1963, and thc failurc of altcmpts by somc officcrs to projcct thc army into a morc aetivist and radical role in 1971, had restored thc command hicrarchy to an impressive dcgrcc.
Bcsidcs factors rclatcd to thc intcrnal structurc of thc military in Turkey, thc extcrnal environment also has to bc born in mind. In spite of thc ups and downs of Turkey's rclationship vvilh her NATO allics sincc thc 1950s, the commandcrs have alvvays bccn vvcll avvarc that Turkey's dcfcncc ultimatcly depends on elose collaboration vvilh ıhc alliancc. Thc commitmcnt to achicving Atalürk's ambition of making Turkey a respccted member of Ihc vvestern comity of nations has also meant that they have supportcd thc drive to altain full membership of thc European Communily, 28 even if this mcans a degree and spccd of political liberalisalion vvhich ihcy mighı oihcrvvise have bccn rclucUint lo acccpt.
In April 1987 Turkey oflicially applicd to thc European Community for admission as a full member. Evcntually, in Dcccmbcr 1989, thc EC Commission issucd an official Opinion, in vvhich it turncd dovvn ıhc idea of any negotialions lcading to acccssion before 1993 at ıhc earlicst. Thc Opinion vvas later adoptcd by thc EC Council of Ministcrs. Bcsides the predietable cconomic problems, thc fact ıhal "thc human rights situalion and rcspcct for thc identity of minoritics have not yet rcachcd ıhc level rcquircd in a dcmocracy" vvas cilcd as a rcason for this decision. 29 Although the 1980-83 rcgimc had never bccn vvilling to admit that thc rclum to civilian govcrnmcnt had not even parlly bccn motivated by forcign policy considcrations, it seems to have bccn acccptcd by bolh thc military and thc civilian govcrnmcnis ıhal furlhcr political liberalisalion vvould bc a ncccssary condition for Turkey's eventual acccssion to the Community. This considcration vvas rcinlorccd by the dramalic political transformations in castcrn Europe of 1989-90: as a member of thc NATO, Turkey could not allovv herself to bc crcdibly presented as bcing less dcmocratic than thc members of thc novv defunet Warsaw Pact.
Thc necd for a stable succcssor rcgimc acceptablc lo thc military has also been menlioncd as an important condition for succcssful disengagement. Here, again, conditions in Turkey in thc 1980s vverc favourablc. Although President Evren had delivered a much criticiscd TV address on ıhc cvc of ıhc 1983 eleetions, in vvhich hc implicitly urged Ihc clcctoratc to voıc for Turgul 28 As an illustration of ıhis, the military rcgimc of 1980-83 announced several times that, oncc democratic govcrnmcnt had bccn restored, Turkey vvould submit an application for full membership of the EC. Setting aside the qucstion as to vvhether the ruling generals vverc entitled to commit a subscquent civilian regime to taking this step, there can bc little doubt that they supportcd the principle of acccssion as a logical outeome of the Hc continucd to maintain that his own govcrnmcnt vvas well on thc way to solving Turkcy's problems before 12 Scptcmbcr 1980, and that thc coup was therefore unjustificd.
32 Ncvcrthclcss, thc junta vvas able to hand over povvcr in 1983 vvithout thc fcar that thc civilian regime vvould later try to upset ali that it had achicved over thc prcvious three ycars, or try to bring its members to book for alleged misdceds vvhile they had bccn in povvcr. 33 Whcn basic revisions of thc post-1983 political order took place (such as thc return of political rights to thc prc-1980 party lcadcrs in 1987) il vvas in conditions that thc military vvere preparcd to acccpt.
To conclude, il has to bc admittcd thal thc process of disengagement has not mcant that, by thc beginning of thc 1990s, thc eyele of military intervention, vvithdravval, crisis and rcinlcrvcntion has dcfinitcly bccn endcd by the beginning of thc 1990s. Should Turkcy relapse again into thc anarchic conditions of thc late 1970s, ıhcn it is likely that thc armcd forccs vvould inlcrvcne again, and just possible ihat they might dccidc to stay in povvcr for a longer period, rathcr than rc-start thc cyclc. In spite of thc modification of thc military's position of islam and sccularism, moves by thc Mothcrland Party or any othcr administration vvhich appcarcd to undermine thc sccularist principlc to an unacccptablc degree vvould probably lcad to a sharp reaction from thc armcd forccs (probably taking thc form of a pointcd public vvarning
